Hidden prompt injection detector

Text can carry instructions that people can’t see but AI models can read. Paste an email, web page, review or document here before you hand it to an AI. ClepBoard decodes any hidden message and gives you a safe copy.

Removes only what you cannot see. Every visible character is left exactly as it was.
Paste

Paste anything.

Press Ctrl V anywhere on this page, drop a text file, or try an example:

Clean
1 Paste text on the left
2 See what’s hiding in the X-ray
3 Copy it back, clean
Fixes8 rules on · 0 changes made

Hidden characters

AI & markdown

Typography

Layout & spacing

Keyboard: Ctrl+Enter copies the clean text, Ctrl+Shift+Enter copies rich text, keys 1 to 6 switch presets, X toggles the X-ray.

How hidden prompts work

Unicode has a block of tag characters (U+E0000 to U+E007F) that mirror every ASCII letter but render as nothing at all. Browsers, editors, chat apps and email clients show them as blank. Many AI models, though, read them like normal text. An attacker can hide a sentence like “ignore previous instructions and …” inside an innocent message, a technique known as ASCII smuggling.

A related trick hides bytes inside runs of variation selectors attached to an emoji, so a single 😀 can carry a whole message.

These techniques have been used in phishing campaigns to slip past keyword filters, and in prompt-injection attacks against AI assistants and agents that read emails, web pages and documents.

What ClepBoard does

  1. Detects tag characters, stray variation selectors, zero-width characters and direction overrides.
  2. Decodes hidden tag text and variation-selector payloads and shows you the actual message in a red warning.
  3. Removes them so you can copy a safe version. Legitimate uses, like the tag characters inside the 🏴 England and Scotland flags, are preserved.

When to use it

  • Before pasting an email, PDF, job application or web page into ChatGPT, Claude or Copilot
  • When reviewing documents that will be fed to an AI agent or RAG pipeline
  • When a model behaves strangely after reading a piece of text
  • When checking user-submitted content for smuggled instructions

FAQ

Do all AI models read Unicode tag characters?

Not all, and it changes as providers add filters. Several widely used models have been shown to read them. Since there is almost no legitimate reason for them to appear in normal text, it is safest to remove them.

Can it catch prompt injections written in normal visible text?

No. ClepBoard finds instructions hidden with invisible characters. Visible injection text ("ignore your instructions…") is plain to read, so review it yourself.

Is the text I check sent anywhere?

No. Everything runs in your browser, which matters when you are checking sensitive documents.

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